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Public Private Partnership in Urban Infrastructure Projects: `Getting
Sweet Curd from Spoilt Milk ?’
Biju Varkkey
Abstract:
Rapid growth in urban population has made Solid Waste Management an
important issue for civic administration.   The 74
th amendment of the
Constitution of India and Municipal Solid Wastes (Management and
Handling) Rules 2000 has made municipal solid waste management the
responsibility of urban local bodies (city corporations and municipal
corporations).  Further, the Supreme Court of India, acting on Public
Interest Litigation directed all urban local governments to install
scientific solid waste treatment plants before a set timeline.
Installing a scientific waste management system was a costly
proposition, which many urban bodies found difficult to bear.  Many
have sought participation of the private sector in solid waste
management.
The city corporation of Thiruvananthapuram also invited participation
of Poabs Group to set up a waste processing plant in the corporation
owned land outside the city.  Right from inception the project ran
into social and political opposition.  The investor was enticed by
the government to stick to the project by offering various
concessions.  There were interface issues of very serious nature
between the plant and corporation employees whose support was
absolutely necessary for continued, viable operation of the plant.
However, the concessions remained in paper and the operations of the
plant reached a stalemate. Based on the experiences of the private
investor, various governance and policy level implications for public
private participation in urban infrastructure projects (specifically
solid waste management) are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Urban areas are centers for economic activity and employment
generation and the spatial dimension of all that is dynamic in the
society and economy.  Estimates place its contribution to India’s GDP
as around 60%. According to 2001 census, nearly 28 % of Indian
population is urbanized. It contributes to 57 % of employment,
excluding the agricultural sector. The growth of urban areas,
including that due to the natural migration from rural areas in
search of better opportunities, puts pressure on urban infrastructure
in areas like transport housing, water, power, sanitation and waste
management.
Managing the increasing amount of waste produced in urban areas
continue to be a challenging task for urban managers and governments.
Through the 74th amendment of the Constitution of India, urban local
governments (municipal and city corporations) were empowered to deal
with urban waste. That responsibility places heavy burden (financial
and otherwise) on the local governments, who were already facing
paucity for funds. As a result, they have increasingly sought private
participation to manage urban waste
1.  Interventions by GOI and the
Supreme Court of India had reinforced the need for urgent attention
to the problem.
Urban solid waste management (SWM) could be divided into a four-stage
process comprising of waste generation, b) collection c) treatment
and d) residue management. Over time, urban bodies had created
systems to handle the waste, and in the process enlisted a separate
cadre of employees. Unorganized ragpickers were also involved by
default at different stages of the waste treatment process. Land
filling and burning were the common treatment methods employed to
dispose the waste. Experiences indicate that the efficiency level of
solid waste handling, when done directly by the government was low.
Reasons for the inefficiency, included factors like weak
infrastructure, financial constrains, lack of equipment, low employee
motivation, organisation structure, process inappropriate to the
task, and prevalence of vested interests.
Privatization of the process generally implied the transfer of one or
more of the stages to the private investor. The agency got
                                                          
1 Urban waste is highly heterogeneous in character. Discussions in this
paper are confined only to Solid Waste Management.C:\kandarp\iima\data\2002-09-06 (Biju Varkkey).doc
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remunerated for the activity. There are instances where community and
NGO involvement were experimented with success
2. Current initiatives
in SW management try to ensure that SW would be put to productive use
through recycling, other commercial propositions like energy
generation, bio-fertilizers etc.  Thiruvananthapuram city corporation
3
privatized the treatment of solid waste, where the private investor
constructed the treatment plant on Build-Own-Operate-Maintain (BOOM)
basis and had to recover investment by selling the residue in the
market.   Other stages of the process, specifically collection and
transportation was the responsibility of the corporation.
Solid Waste Management before the Project
Like other urban centers, Thiruvananthapuram also faced problems
related to disposal of the solid waste. Often, untreated solid waste
used to be left at public places and it created problems like
obstruction to smooth traffic flow, foul smell, blocking of drains
and other health hazards. Prior attempts to solve the problem had not
succeeded. Corporation employees collected the waste from the city
and transported it to pre-identified locations where it was dumped or
openly burned.
Due to near uniform degree of urbanization across the state and the
high population density, availability of vacant land was severely
limited. Moreover, land cost being on the higher side, it was not
only difficult to procure land for dumping solid waste but also such
an activity was cost inefficient. The city was thus forced to depend
on sites that had already outlived their lives. One site was close to
the international airport was it threatened aircraft safety. Other
sites were near residential areas and there was considerable public
pressure to relocate.
As the city grew, the administration was under pressure to identify
more land for dumping.  Irrespective of political affiliation, it
became a common issue for all political parties
4. The need was to
create a sustainable solution, but it never happened. Some attention
                                                          
2 See, Rath, Binayak (2002) `SWM and Peoples Participation: A Case Study of Kanpur Nagar Nigam’, in India
Infrastructure Report 2002: Governance Issues for Commercialization, 31 Network, Oxford, NewDelhi, pp. 229 –
235.
3 Capital city of Kerala, with population of 75 lakh (2001, Census of India).
4  Waste Management continues to be one of the issues over which elections to local bodies are fought.
Irrespective of political affiliation, the issue figures in all the manifestoes.C:\kandarp\iima\data\2002-09-06 (Biju Varkkey).doc
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was given to increasing collection efficiency, but as the dumping
sites became over-saturated, its impact diminished. Corporation
employees either refused to collect waste from the collection points
or if it was done, offloaded it in vacant areas around the city.
Informally, limited recycling and sorting of SW happened through
ragpickers.  A section of employees were reportedly a party to the
recycling.
As a long-term solution to the problem, the corporation decided to
identify land outside the city limits, preferably in a sparsely
populated area. In 1989, the corporation procured 12.5 acres of land
in Vilapil panchayath, 8 km away from the city limits. As soon as the
news about location of the corporation waste dumping ground spread,
the residents of Vilapil panchayat started an agitation. The action
committee of citizens formed to oppose the corporation’s decision
approached the court and obtained an order that temporarily prevented
the corporation from further action.
5
Supreme Court Judgement and SWM
Lack of proper attention to safe and scientific treatment of Solid
Waste (SW) could create disastrous consequences to quality of life,
not only in the city but also in surrounding areas. The effects were
proved as harmful to human, animal and plant life. Untreated waste
apart from polluting land, water and air contributed to deteriorating
quality of life.  Accumulated solid waste piled up on roadsides
obstructed city traffic and caused difficulties for pedestrians.
The general apathy of civic administrations in India while dealing
with city waste had forced environmental activists to approach the
Supreme Court of India with a public interest petition. They prayed
for a court directive to state and central governments to establish
solid waste processing facilities in all large cities. The Supreme
Court (1999) passed an interim judgement instructing the government
to ensure that all cities with population of more than one lakh had
facilities for scientific treatment of solid waste. Subsequently,
Government of India notified the Municipal Waste (Management and
Handling Rules) in September 2000, specifying the parameters and
                                                          
5 Formal city limit in Kerala is merely an administrative category, with little meaning otherwise. The above
situation is because of uniform urbanization in a large part of the state.C:\kandarp\iima\data\2002-09-06 (Biju Varkkey).doc
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compliance criteria for different activities related to solid waste
handling in cities.
THE PROJECT.
In order to comply with the Supreme Court directive, the corporation
decided to establish a modern facility for scientific treatment of
solid waste.
6 Government of Kerala (GOK) also supported the
corporation’s proposal.
7  Since the corporation was not in a position
to finance the venture, private participation was invited. According
to the announcement made by corporation, the SW treatment plant was
to be located at Vilapil where corporation had acquired land.
Eventhough, the corporation was interested in Excel Industries Ltd.
8,
and had contacted them directly to set up the plant, they were
reluctant to invest directly in Kerala.
The Bid
The corporation invited national bids for SW treatment facility and
four agencies indicated interest in the venture. Poabs Group of
Companies, a Kerala based industrial group with interests in
construction, farming etc was awarded the contract for developing the
solid waste processing plant on Build-Own-Operate-Maintain basis.
Poabs Group had proposed to use the technology of Excel Industries
that converted organic solid waste into bio-fertilizer through
anaerobic process. The plant was to be located on the land, leased to
the company by the corporation for 30 years. The bio-fertilizer would
be sold in the market to recover the investment.  Though they did not
have any prior experience in SW treatment, they had interests in
organic farming and their 833-acre farm was the largest multi crop
organic farm in India and employed 700 workers. The group bought the
farm from European planters and every year Oranges from the farm was
shipped to the Queen of England.  The group had a captive organic
waste processing plant that used accelerated aerobic composting to
convert farm waste into organic manure.  An in-house research team of
                                                          
6 In order to win popular support, corporation initiated a “clean city” movement, of which SWM was an important
component.
7 The Left Democracy Front (LDF) was in power at both the state government and city corporation did help in
winning support.  However, though Vilapil panchayat where the waste treatment faulty was eventually located
was also with LDF similar support from the facility did not come through.
8 Excel Industries Ltd. is a Rs 4000 million company, which has the required know-how about solid waste
management through anaerobic process. (www.excelind.com)C:\kandarp\iima\data\2002-09-06 (Biju Varkkey).doc
6
the group was engaged in developing environmental friendly pesticides
for use in organic farms.  In addition, the group was one of the
largest public works contractors in Kerala.
Meanwhile, the residents of Vilapil resumed agitation after they
learned about the project through the media. There was directed
against the decision to transport city waste to their locality in
order to keep the city clean. All political parties (including the
LDF that was in power at Vilapil) and social as well as religious
groups supported the agitation. To avoid direct confrontation between
the residents and bidders, corporation dissuaded the bidders from
visiting the location before submitting the bids. Poabs group
representatives officially
9 visited the location with police
protection only after the bid was finalized in their favor.
Bargaining for Concessions.
However, after the visit and conducting a preliminary feasibility
study, the group decided to withdraw from the project. The decision
was orally conveyed to the corporation leadership. The feasibility
study established that the project cost would be around Rs 90
million, while the cost for a similar capacity facility would have
been closer to Rs 50 million
10. Financial Institutions were reluctant
to lend at such high project cost, caused by some undisclosed
constraints. Excel Industries who provided the technology also
advised withdrawal. But the political leadership of the corporation
and GoK (both ruled by LDF) were adamant on building the plant at the
earliest.
The corporation approached Poabs Group to re-negotiate. The city
mayor took special interest in negotiating with the group and
coordinating with GoK. At that time GoK had declared an informal
moratorium on payments to contractors who had undertaken construction
work for the government, and around Rs. 50 million was due to Poabs
Group on that account.  As an incentive to take the project, the
group was promised immediate release of the dues, bypassing the
                                                          
9 They made an informal attempt to visit the location, but failed to reach the site since action committee members
recognized them and they were forced to return.
10  The layout of the land was along a steep slope and it required additional investment to level. After leveling, the
effective useable area got reduced to 4 acres from 12.5 acres.  The entire plant area had to be covered with roof to
prevent rainwater.C:\kandarp\iima\data\2002-09-06 (Biju Varkkey).doc
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payment schedule set by GOK.   In addition, the following were
offered
11.
•  Thiruvananthapuram Corporation will provide land, approach road,
electricity at concessional rates etc on priority basis.
•  The corporation will be responsible for collection  and delivery
of unprocessed waste to the site, every day. The corporation will
bear all costs related to the above operation.
•  The corporation will deliver 300 tonnes of organic waste to the
factory every day.  In case the corporation failed to deliver
adequate quantity, compensation will be paid to the company.
•  Steps will be taken to settle local agitation and obstructions to
the smooth functioning of the plant. Poabs can also request for
police protection, if required.
•  The government will help the company to avail central government
subsidy to the tune of Rs. 0.50 million.
•  State Agriculture department will buy organic fertilizer directly
from the company (without the normal government procedure of
tenders) at a fixed price
12.
Revised Business Model
Based on assurances from the corporation and GOK, Poabs Group formed
a company called Poabs Envirotech (P) Ltd. to develop and manage the
new venture. The technology deployed was anaerobic (check with Biju)
processing developed by Excel Industries
13. Excel agreed to provide
the required technical training to employees of Poabs Envirotech and
station their employees (technical experts) in the plant for
supervision and troubleshooting. The group generated Rs 90 million
                                                          
11 The concessions were negotiated at different points, some after the plant was commissioned.
12 This was not part of the contract signed by corporation and Poabs. The agreement was arrived after negotiations
with GOK, not corporation.
13 Technology choice was taken in favour of aerobic decomposition since the group had exposure to it in their
farm. Also, this was considered more suitable to the waste composition, that included harbor (fish) and
slaughterhouse refuse, market waste, hotel waste etc. The process was fast (45 day) exothermic and without foul
smell. The process was considered superior to other organic waste conversion options like pelletization, grinding,
power generation through anaerobic digestion and composting through vermin-culture. Treatment of garbage with
specially developed biological inoculum causes accelerated bioconversion in an exothermic environment
destroying harmful pathogens and seeds. The process is considered environmental friendly and without any side
effects on people handling the waste.C:\kandarp\iima\data\2002-09-06 (Biju Varkkey).doc
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for the project through internal accruals. (The promoters expected
immediate release of Rs 50 million from government and central
government subsidy of 0.50 million, but both never came through.
Though the ministry of non-conventional energy provides incentives
for pilot power generation projects from solid waste, the technology
chosen by the group did not support power generation Other
concessions and help promised like preferential treatment for power
connection from KSEB did not materialize.)
The plant was installed with the capacity to process 400 tonnes of
organic waste per-day and corporation was obliged to deliver 300
tonnes of organic waste to the plant, daily (Guaranteed MSW).
Corporation employees had to collect SW from the city and transport
it to the factory in vehicles arranged by the corporation. They were
expected to sanitize the waste before transporting. Sanitation was
necessary to prevent decomposition at the collection point. The
company was entitled for compensation at the rate of Rs 49000 per day
from the corporation, if the delivery commitment failed. The revenue
inflow came from the sale of organic waste to the state agriculture
department (as per agreement with government) and in the open market.
Poabs was expected to pay 2% of the sales to the corporation as
royalty. Some revenue was expected from the sale of waste with resale
value, like metal and rubber (truck tyres). Annual land rental
payable to corporation was Rs 1 per sq meter.
The SW Treatment Process
Corporation employees collect unsegregated waste from different parts
of the city and store them at points for transportation to the
treatment plant. By that time, decomposition would have started,
raising foul smell. Hence a biological agent that retards
decomposition would be applied. The sanitized waste would them be
delivered to the company. Poabs maintained a weighbridge at the site
to track the quantity and quality of waste. They had powers to reject
the waste if it was contaminated by construction, industrial,
chemical or hospital waste.
Inside the treatment plant, the waste was manually sorted to remove
non-organic contaminants like metal, rubber, plastic, stones, glass
etc. The organic part was heaped and a special bacteria colony would
be introduced to accelerate the aerobic decomposition process.
Special chemicals would be added to prevent foul smell.  Bacterial
action continues on each heap (churned in intervals for betterC:\kandarp\iima\data\2002-09-06 (Biju Varkkey).doc
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results) for 40 days, followed by thermal treatment of the residue at
80 degree C to neutralize living seeds and other pathogens. The final
product would be sold in the market under the brand POABS GREEN.
Community Opposition to the Project - Stage I
The residents of Vilapil village led by the village panchayath and
various groups had opposed the location of garbage dumping facility
in 1989 itself. As a result, the 12.5 acre land owned by
Thiruvanantapuram corporation in the village was left as it was.
Agitation against the corporation restarted when news about the
location of the treatment plant in corporation land became public. At
that stage, the protest was not directed against the Poabs Group, but
against the corporation for locating the plant in their village.
Since the corporation already owned the land, eviction of residents
and rehabilitation of project affected people were not issues. The
local community was worried about the possible deterioration in the
quality of life and reduction in land value. According to them, the
village was a scenic and a preferred as a residential location by
city residents moving away from the centre.  Land prices in the
locality had increased after city residents started to purchase land
in the area. Initially, citizens groups led the protests. Soon the
Vilapil panchayath and local affiliates of political parties took
over. While they recognized the need for such a project, they wanted
the corporation to shift the project elsewhere, preferably within the
city.
At first, the corporation attempted a political solution to the
agitation, through the Left Democratic Front (LDF) that was in power
at the state, in Thiruvananthapuram Corporation and also the
panchayath. As a conflict resolution technique, the corporation on
its expense sponsored a study tour for a 30 member delegation to a
similar plant (technology provided by Excel Industries Ltd.) in
Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh.  Representatives of residents, local
leaders of all political parties and elected representatives of the
panchayath were in the delegation. The objective of the study tour
was to educate them about the technology and remove fears about
perceived harmful effects of a solid waste processing plant.  But the
visit failed to help the corporation to alleviate the fears and
opposition to the project. Political infighting between parties
complicated the dispute and the corporation was not able be build a
consensus. From the cost-benefit perspective, the project was seen toC:\kandarp\iima\data\2002-09-06 (Biju Varkkey).doc
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largely benefit the city and its population without any advantage to
the panchayat.
Project Execution
In spite of protests from the locality, the corporation went ahead
with the contract. Poabs Group was pressurized to commence
construction, before the agitation turned more forceful. The plant,
considered the one of the largest of its kind in Asia was completed
in record time, under the supervision of Excel Industries. Under the
agreement, POABS group had 18 months time to complete construction of
the processing plant and commission it. However, Poabs Group finished
construction of the 400 tonne per-day capacity plant in five months.
1.5 lakh cubic meters of soil was shifted to level the land, In
addition entire plant area was covered by asbestos to protect it from
rain and the boundary was fenced so that fears about birds and
animals spilling the garbage were removed. The Chief Minister of
Kerala inaugurated the plant on 24, July 1999 and it became
operational by October 1999.
Community Opposition to the Project - Stage II
As a symbol of their protest against the processing plant and the
government, villagers boycotted the inauguration function. An action
committee of villagers led the boycott move, with the support of all
political parties and other community leaders.  According to the
action committee members, their apprehensions came true after the
plant started functioning.  In the subsequent months, the media
reported that:
a)  The air quality of the village, particularly
in the surrounding area deteriorated due to the foul smell of
decomposing waste.
b)  Pollution of the fresh water stream flowing
through the village that resulted in health hazards to the villages
who used it for bathing and washing. Some villages reported skin
rashes and sores after bathing.
c)  The village was attacked by swarm of flies
and insects.
d)  Decomposing waste from the corporation trucks
transporting garbage to the plant spilled over on roadsides andC:\kandarp\iima\data\2002-09-06 (Biju Varkkey).doc
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remained there. There was no system to collect the spilled waste and
foul smell enveloped the area.
e)  Presence of yellowish liquid mass around the
factory and near the stream.
f)  Residents from other villages refused to
enter into social relationships (marriage) with the village residents
due to the social stigma attached to staying near the plant.
g)  Demand as well as price of land had
plummeted.
To express their protests, the action council decided to block the
garbage carrying trucks from entering the village. The panchayat
passed a unanimous resolution requesting the government to close down
the factory. The villagers were uncompromising about the plant and
wanted it to be shifted elsewhere. Police acted against the agitators
who had blocked the trucks, and many activists were booked for
obstructing public servants from discharging duty.  (Reportedly,
there were also incidents like stone pelting and physical assault of
corporation employees accompanying the trucks.)  Police action turned
the villagers against the group, and the villagers accused the
company of influencing the police to act against their peaceful
agitation.
The villagers filed a petition before the High Court of Kerala and
the court ordered an investigation by the Kerala State Pollution
Control Board.  In addition several cases were filed against the
plant and the group by private individuals, in the lower courts.
Following the adverse media reports against the plant, the state
Ombudsman for Local Bodies issued notice to the corporation and
demanded a report on the functioning of the plant and the
environmental and health problems caused by its presence. Meanwhile,
the action council initiated a mass signature campaign to be
submitted to the CM and planned protest meetings inside
Thiruvananthapuram city, including a `dharna’ (sit in strike) in
front of the secretariat building.
A monitoring committee chaired by the District Collector had to act
as the watchdog over the performance of the plant. Though the
committee was set up before the plant was commissioned, it neverC:\kandarp\iima\data\2002-09-06 (Biju Varkkey).doc
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functioned.  Only after the court and the ombudsman intervened in the
problem, the corporation initiated steps to convene the meeting. The
action committee suspended the agitation, since their grievance was
before the court.  As a conciliatory gesture, corporation agreed to
transport waste to the site only at night so those residents along
the truck route were protected from transient odour.
The group also got involved in the efforts to pacify the agitation.
It offered daily wage employment (Rs 150 per day) to local residents
in the plant, but not many turned up because of the strong social
ostrasisation. It complied with the additional requirements imposed
by the state pollution control board (PCB) like covering the sides of
the plant and constructing a sedimentation tank to collect every drop
of rainwater, though it increased operating cost. (According to
Poabs, some of the PCB requirements were un-necessary). Diary grass
was planted on unused land around the plant for the benefit of the
villagers. Eventually some residents were ready to sell the land at a
good price and the corporation acquired additional 18 acres around
the plant
14. But the populated areas (people there had problems with
the plant) were left out.
FACT FINDING MISSIONS
As the dispute intensified, it invited lot of media attention. While
the corporation and Poabs stood their stand that the project was
environment friendly, residents complained about the effects on
health and environment.  Various agencies got involved in studying
the operations.
Internal Study
As per the agreement, the corporation was responsible for collecting
and transporting garbage to the plant.  Corporation workers with
government employee status did that work. For processing
effectiveness, specified pre-treatment of waste had to be done at the
collection points and corporation was responsible for that.  The
waste had to be sanitized applying biological inoculums (a bacterial
spray that reduces water content in garbage and lessens the foul
smell) at the collection point.
                                                          
14 According to company, additional land was acquired at Rs 10,000 per cent, while the market rate was Rs 4000
per cent. A cent is a hundredth of an acre.C:\kandarp\iima\data\2002-09-06 (Biju Varkkey).doc
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Corporation employees were not keen to sanitize the waste, and even
if they wanted the inoculums were in short supply. Neither the
corporation nor the company took initiative to train corporation
employees in sanitization. Most trucks used for transportation were
open bodied and loading was done carelessly. Untreated waste fell out
from the trucks during transportation. Corporation employees refused
to clean the spill from waysides and left it to decompose there. That
directed the public against the company. On the other hand, employees
complained about lack of tools for SW collection and loading, short
supply of inoculums and lack of adequate number of trucks.
Waste was a good business proposition for some corporation employees,
who made money from it.  Builders and landowners used SW as landfill
material. Some farmers also sought the waste to convert it into
compost for their farms. They bought waste directly from the
employees, who used corporation’s trucks to deliver the waste. There
were also instances when the employees received some rent to clear
waste regularly. SW treatment plant implied an indirect stop to such
rents, and they protested by engaging in acts that brought down the
reputation of the plant.
The unions of government employees were apprehensive about the
possible job loss and non-creation of further employment
opportunities. The feared, even if there was no job loss, the
possibility of privatizing garbage collection in the next stage
existed.
Media was very active in highlighting the adverse effects of the
plant on villagers. However,  a section of media highlighted the
vested interests behind the business of garbage handling also. Some
political activists were unhappy with the introduction of scientific
waste treatment, since it took away a very potent political weapon
from their hands. Many political leaders had exploited the issue to
their advantage and installation of the treatment plant was a blow to
them. They felt that the city mayor, who piloted the project and
supported Poabs, received public attention and political mileage.
Subsequently, demand for closing the plant became the political
agenda.
State Pollution Control BoardC:\kandarp\iima\data\2002-09-06 (Biju Varkkey).doc
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State pollution control board was involved with the project from
initial stages itself. Later, on instructions from the court, PCB
studied the plant, specifically from the contamination of water,
particularly a fresh water stream used by locals for bathing and
washing. They found no technical possibility of water contamination,
but raised the possibility of rainwater mixing with garbage during
rainy season. (Kerala has heavy rains for six months a year.
According to company sources, the stream was dry when pollution
control board inspected the plant). Since the plant was located on a
hillside, there was possibility for contaminated water flowing down.
The board chairperson even went to the extend of describing the plant
as “ certainly the best waste treatment plant in India” , but did not
rule out negligence from different stakeholders
15.  At the same time,




A solid waste consultant of the World Bank visited the plant and
opined that the technology was very appropriate and cost effective.
Report by Expert appointed by GOK
In the light of allegations about environmental damages caused by the
plant, GOK requested a reputed environmentalist to review operations
of the plant. While the expert accepted that odour was a problem, she
expressed satisfaction with the technology and precautionary measures
adopted by the plant. On the contrary, the problem was traced to the
waste collection side. It was observed that the waste delivered to
the plant was already in decay due to collection and transportation
inefficiencies. The night only transportation rule was also
questioned, since it forced garbage to lie unattended during daytime
and caused it to rot.
The report lauded the company and suggested that the corporation
extend more support for its smooth functioning including additional
land for the plant (though promised, power connection was not given,
forcing the plant to work on generators). The company was advised to
go for minor process improvements to reduce the odour and improve
cost effectiveness.
                                                          
15  Source: Report in The Week, Feb 21, 2001.
16 Source: Comments recorded in the visitors diary maintained by Poabs GreenC:\kandarp\iima\data\2002-09-06 (Biju Varkkey).doc
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PROJECT RISKS AND THE STALEMATE
Input Risk
The corporation and company acted on some of the concerns based on
reports.  Apart from procuring more biological inoculates for
sanitation, the corporation constituted a separate supervisory squad
to monitor the garbage collection process. Even though, the smell
from properly inoculated garbage was reduced after sanitation; it was
impossible to fully control it. The company constructed a boundary
wall around the factory to prevent rainwater from mixing with
garbage. The villagers were then worried about the possibility of
ground water contamination.
In spite of commitments, the corporation failed to fulfill the
quantitative obligations even on one day.  While the contact required
daily supply of 300 tonnes of garbage, the corporation was able to
deliver on an average 100 tonnes of garbage. According to company
records the maximum delivery was 150 tonnes. Though sufficient waste
was generated in the city, the corporation was not equipped with
sufficient logistical support to service the obligation. When the
poor work habits and rent-seeking behavior of corporation employees
were cited as reasons for inefficiency, the employee unions pointed
to shortage of trucks. The proposal to purchase more trucks was
caught in red tape. Moreover, the truck purchase plans got disturbed,
since the plant was commissioned in five months instead of the
proposed 18 months and the corporation required more lead time to
complete purchases.  Efforts to hire private vehicles were
unsuccessful due to unattractive rent fixed by the corporation and
reluctance of truck owners to rent them for garbage transportation.
Quality of SW delivered at the plant was another concern. High
quality wastes like slaughterhouse refuses and market waste was
missing, since they already had a ready market outside. Instead, low
quality waste like leaves used for packing and coconut husks was
transported. The latter was heavy and made up quantity, but not very
useful for processing. The waste was also moist (up to 50% while
acceptable was 25%) and contaminated, predominantly by sand (20%). As
a result, the final conversion rate was around 13%, (13 tonnes of
bio-fertilizer for 100 tonnes waste) while the industry standard was
25%. The wear and tear of machinery increased due to contamination,C:\kandarp\iima\data\2002-09-06 (Biju Varkkey).doc
16
resulting in higher maintenance costs. The company was also finding




According to the business model, sale of bio-fertilizer manufactured
from SW was the major revenue stream. Before the group initiated the
project, GOK had promised to procure the bio-fertilizer through the
agricultural department and other agencies of the government.
Fertilizer purchase was decentralized and the agriculture officer was
responsible for purchases. Subsequently, GOK issued a government
order (No 48916/03/99 L.S.G.D) instructing agriculture department to
initiate necessary steps to procure the product at the government
fixed price of Rs 4.50 per kg. The agriculture department also
instructed its officers to purchase the product. But, politically,
the decision was questioned, since the government was seen to favour
a single manufacturer.  In spite of assurances by government and
sales efforts by the company, the officials refused to purchase from
the company. Many officers were already engaged with established
suppliers and they were reluctant to break the relationship. There
were also allegations about rent seeking also.
Though there was no single acceptable quality standard for bio-
fertilizers in India, the company ensured that its product was of
high quality and suitable for crops. Inputs for that was sought from
Kerala Agriculture University. Apart from general purpose products,
value added bio-fertilizer enriched with bacteria was also introduced
in the market. Faculty from School of Environmental Studies, Cochin
University of Science and Technology closely monitored the quality
standards, both of the product and emissions. They also maintained in
house quality control and research laboratory. The quality check
ensured that all seeds and parasites present in the fertilizer were
dead and chemical traces were removed from the fertilizer.  The group
also devoted resources to brand their product as `Poabs Green’; and
retailed it through supermarkets and plant nurseries. Company sales
personnel contacted plant nurseries and purchase points (mainly
agriculture officers of government and purchase in-charge for private
farms/estates) to direct sell their product.   At the same time,
products with generic name `Organic’ flooded the market. Many small
manufactures with inferior technology and zero quality practices were
                                                          
17 Since the court has banned sand mining from rivers, the sand accumulated by Poabs may have a ready market.
18 Includes revenue and market risk.C:\kandarp\iima\data\2002-09-06 (Biju Varkkey).doc
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able to save manufacturing costs and their product was available
cheap.
The unregulated quality standards for bio-fertilizers prevented Poabs
from differentiating its products. Bio-fertilizer ran into a
reputation risk in Kerala after some agencies marketed burnt
industrial waste as organic, causing crop damage. There were also
instances where coloured and chemically treated farm waste was sold
as organic product. There were also instances where low cost
manufacturers sold inferior product under Poabs Green label using
recycled packing.  Such instances affected the market credibility of
bio-fertilizers and the company. Agriculture officers were reluctant
to suggest the product in the absence of specific standards.
Though some revenue was also planned from sale of reusable waste like
metal, rubber etc., the company could not realize that. Informal
ragpickers collected the valuable waste before it reached the plant.
The company found storing and disposing non-reusable (organic and
non-organic) waste as a problem.  Though they requested for
permission to burn some waste like leaves (the burnt residue
containing potash can be used an enricher), the permission did not
come through.
At cross roads.
Even after two years of operation (December 2001), the situation at
ground level had not improved much. The political composition of GOK
changed after the general elections in April 2001. The new
governments demanded time to study the issue. Local agitation also
refused to die. The legislator (MLA) who represented Vilapil area had
promised during election that, `if elected, the plant will be closed’
got actively involved in agitations. Without any improvement in
sight, the group decided to withdraw from the project and requested
GOK to take over the plant at cost. However GOK prevailed on them to
continue.  Table I summarizes the conflict areas between the company
and various stakeholders.
PRIVATE PUBLIC PARTNERSHIP IN SWM: LEARNINGS FROM THE EXPERIENCE
Involvement of private sector in solid waste management in Indian
cities is bound to increase. Traditional practices like land filling
and open burning are not preferred anymore due to the high cost ofC:\kandarp\iima\data\2002-09-06 (Biju Varkkey).doc
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land and environmental impacts. Local governments are moving to
alternate solutions like Waste-to-Fertilizer, Waste-to-Energy and
Waste-to-Reuse, with the involvement of private sector and community.
The experience of Poabs Group discussed above raises some critical
issues.
Project Location and Community Interface.
Identifying suitable land for infrastructure projects is a difficult
task. The problem becomes more profound when land requirement is in
thickly populated localities. The local community members for
multiple reasons, that include economic, health and political reasons
generally resist land acquisition. Existing legal framework for land
acquisition and price fixation is inadequate to meet current market
requirements.
The case brings to focus (once again) the limitation of the Land
Acquisition in terms of defining `Project Affected People’. In an
urban waste treatment project, the effects impact an entire
community, not only economically but also socially. Some of the
social costs (like refusal to enter into a marriage relationship with
a resident in the vicinity) are not considered under the legal
framework. But for the community, the social effects are equally
significant.
Community opposition in this case has another dimension. Since the
corporation had acquired land outside city limits, it was interpreted
as a deliberate move to harass the people residing in Vilapil
panchayat area, for the benefit of city residents.
Employee Interface Issues: Government Employees’ v/s Private Sector
Dealing with employees who are well entrenched into the system is a
contentious issue for all private participation initiatives. Employee
unions have been in the forefront to stall privatization, both from
ideological standpoint and to protect interests. Possibility for the
loss of job security and maintenance of conditions of service are
common demands raised. Lack of social security scheme for such
displaced employees forces them to cling to the demand to maintain
status quo.  It is necessary that such concerns be addressed upfront,
both at the political levels and operations levels. Dialoge with
employee unions and assurances about the job continuation, retraining
and a honorable exit option through a liberal separation scheme canC:\kandarp\iima\data\2002-09-06 (Biju Varkkey).doc
19
mitigate the resistance to some degree.  These are going to be very
difficult options taking into consideration the highly unionized
scenario in the state.  Hence more than the private investor, it is
the governments duty to ensure that such a dialogue is initiated.
Some of the efforts initiated by GOK had shown some results, and
there are positive signals about unions accepting private investment
as inevitable.
The next issue is about the vested interests among employee groups.
Inefficient performance monitoring and lack of accountability has
created the culture of low productivity and possible rent seeking
among employees. In the case, evidences indicate that some employees
did engage in such practices. Often employees are observed to be
involved in creating situations that prevent the private investor
from operating at the required efficiency
19.  More stringent
monitoring (like surprise checks) and enforcement of accountability
can help to stem the problems to some extend.
Process Improvement and Technology Selection.
The approach to SW management in India is focussed at resolving the
problem by introducing technology solutions at the end stages of the
SW chain, i.e. processing. Sometimes the decisions are taken under
pressure, including political compulsion or international agencies
that finance such projects.  At source intervention that results in
reduction, segregation and recycling of SW is not attempted, except
for in isolated pockets.   Experience does indicate that results of
solutions without focus on at source management will be unsustainable
and uneconomical. In that context, the contribution of the informal
sector i.e. rag pickers cannot be ignored. Community involvement,
education and co-ordination between waste generation points and
collectors will improve the quality of SW management in Indian
cities.
                                                          
19 Media reports highlighted that, when Delhi Government went ahead with privatization of power transmission.),
various parts of the city experienced power disruptions. Restoration work, according to newspaper reports took
more time than what was taken by the state enterprise (Delhi Vidut Board). One reason cited for the above
situation was that the erstwhile employees of DVB were deliberating sabotaging the power lines. More than any
sort of ideological opposition to privatization, employees were reportedly unhappy about the loss of extra income
from graft, hence restored to sabotage and delayed attending to complaints. But the reasons cited by government
were the learning curve of private agencies and rampant power pilferage.C:\kandarp\iima\data\2002-09-06 (Biju Varkkey).doc
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Different technologies are being used for SW treatment. The Municipal
Waste Management and Handling Rules 2000 has specified standards for
some of them.  However, questions have been raised about the choice
of technology versus the economics of operation. Though both, Waste-
to-Energy and Waste-to-Fertilizer technologies are costly, local
bodies favor them. As a result SW facilities are centralized at one
location, requiring investments in transportation and collection
point sanitation to prevent damage (in case of composting). Low cost
alternatives like recycling or even localizing composting may be
considered. Since an informal local market for waste (using it for
land filling, composting, swine farming etc.) exists, local bodies
can think of converting it to a commercial proposition where
individuals can procure waste for a price. Community groups and NGO
can participate in such initiatives that will reduce the quantity of
waste that needs to be processed at high cost.
Case for a Regulator
In this case, the absence of a proper regulatory framework is a
reason for the precipitation and non-resolution of issues. Proper
regulation is necessary in such instances to ensure a level playing
field and conflict resolution within a uniform framework. The void
allows other agencies to interfere, since there is no clarity about
jurisdictions. In such cases, issues get pushed to the government for
resolution or are challenged in the courts.  Currently, in the
absence other structures, the PCB assumes the function of the
regulator. Under the central rules, SPCB’s have only a technical
compliance role, i.e. to monitor and maintain standards and to
license.  Since the technology itself is new, PCB faces a situation
where the specialized competence required to advise and set standards
is missing. Monitoring committees controlled by district
administration becomes ineffective, since its overburdened members
may not be able to devote sufficient time.
In reality, the role of regulator is much more. The unclear situation
allows multiple agencies to be involved in regulation, affecting the
efficiency of the utility. Without clear accountability for results,
these agencies transfer the ball from one to another without finding
an amicable solution.  An independent regulator with jurisdiction
covering the entire state can be a better option.C:\kandarp\iima\data\2002-09-06 (Biju Varkkey).doc
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Will Sops and Promises Work ?
It is quite customary for governments to offer concessions and soaps
to attract private investment for infrastructure projects with high
risk and low potential for return.  Realization of the promises is
necessary for the smooth functioning of the project, since the
investor would have factored the promises into the business model.
Often such promises fail does not materialise and the entire project
suffers. As the case indicates, the group was forced to invest in the
project by offering soaps that even amounted to bending the rules.
Failure of the government to fulfill commitments has created
difficult situations for the company, government and public.  The
investor also has to share part of the blame for resorting to hard
bargaining tactics and attempting to leverage the vulnerability of
the government to build monopoly positions. In this case, the extra
role initiatives taken by the cooperation Mayor who wanted the
project to be completed has invited criticism including allegations
about possible rent. Failure of such incentive driven projects can
have strong signaling effects on the state government’s credibility
and affect future investments.
The Drama Continues
The repeated pleas to the government, to ensure that the plant's output, as had been agreed, failed. The company refused
to accept waste and notified the corporation its decision. (June 2002) That placed the corporation and GOK in a tight spot
since it was impossible to find an alternate arrangement at short notice. With the intervention of Chief Minister (Shri. A K
Antony) the matter was temporarily resolved. A high level committee of a minister and secretary, Local Administration
Department was appointed to study the issue.
After a month, (August 19, 2002) the company again notified the corporation inability to accept any more waste for further
processing. According to them, they were saddled with accumulated stock due to the refusal of government agencies to
abide by the earlier assurance given. While the stalemate continued over the next fortnight, uncollected garbage continued
to pile up in the city.